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CORPORATE RECAPITALIZATION BY CHARTER
AMENDMENT
TIE DRASTIC curtailment of dividend payments during the lean years fol-
lowing 1929 finds many corporations whose capital structures include cumu-
lative preferred stock entering an era of recovery with accumulations of
dividends accrued and unpaid, which must be made up before the common
shareholders may participate in current earnings. Numerous corporations in
this predicament are seeking to cancel the arrears on their cumulative pre-
ferred stock through charter amendment.' The holders of this class of stock
1. See DEwiNG, FINANCiAL PoLic' OF CoaronATioNs (3rd ed. 1934) 55, 1247
et. seq. Corporations which have recently taken this action include Abercrombie &
Fitch Company, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, The B. F. Goodrich Company, Gimbel
Brothers, Inc., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Marshall Field & Company and
Otis Steel Company.
Practically all state laws provide that any corporation organized thereunder may,
from time to time, change or amend its certificate of incorporation as desired. This
blanket authority to amend is often reinforced by specific power to make particnlar
modifications.
THE 3I:LE LAW JOURNAL
may be persuaded to release their claims to arrears in return for some con-
cession from those who will benefit by such release. This concession usually
takes the form of additional stock, which may or may not be similar to
that already possessed by the preferred shareholder. The typical plan of
capital readjustment adopted to fund arrears provides that the preferred
shareholder exchange his stock with its appurtenant claim to unpaid divi-
dends for new certificates, either preferred or common, with *a clean slate.
If all the preferred shareholders can be induced to accept the proposed
arrangement, its consummation may be a fairly easy task. Difficulty arises
when a minority shareholder takes exception to any impairment of what
lie may consider his "rights," as found in the corporate charter.2 One who
buys shares' of cumulative preferred is considered to make his purchase
largely on the faith of certain representations in the charter of the corpora-
tion, many of which are promissory in character. The charter obligates the
corporation to pay its preferred stockholders stipulated dividends out of
earnings at certain periods. It provides further that no distribution shall be
made to the common shareholders unless and until full payment shall have
been made on the preferred stock for all past dividend periods.3 Although
The procedure generally followed in adopting amendments under this statutory
authority is simple. The board of directors adopts a resolution setting forth the change
proposed, declaring its advisability, and calling a meeting of'the stockholders to con-
sider and vote upon it. Upon confirmation by the requisite vote, as prescribed by the
state laws or the provisions of the original charter, a certificate embodying the change
is filed with the Secretary of State.
2. For the purpose of changing various "rights" claimed under a corporate charter
it is commonly identified as a tripartite contract, between the state and the corporation,
between the corporation and its shareholders, and among the shareholders themselves.
This view of the charter offers two barriers to voluntary recapitalization: the rule that
a contract cannot be modified without the consent of the parties to it; and the consti-
tutional inhibition against the passing of state laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts. The incorporation in the charter of reservation of the power to amend obviates
to some degree the straightjacketing effect of these impediments to changes in the
corporate charter. See supra note 1. For theoretical discussions see Curran, Minority
Stockholders and the Amendnnt of Corporate Charters (1934) 32 Mxcix. L. REv. 743;
Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 585, 723; Comments (1928) 14 CORN. L. Q. 85; (1936) 34 Mxcu. L.
REv. 859; (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 256; (1930) 16 VA. L. Ry. 282; (1937)
23 VA. L. REv. 579; note (1924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 617.
3. A typical charter provision relating to dividends on the cumulative preferred
stock reads as follows: "The holders of the preferred stock shall be entitled to receive
cumulative dividends at the rate of seven per cent per annum and no more, payable
quarter-yearly on the first days of February, May, August and November in each year,
and the corporation shall be obligated to pay the same but only out of its surplus and
net profits. Such dividends on the preferred stock shall be payable before any dividend
shall be paid upon or set apart for the common stock . . . In no event shall any
dividend whatsoever be paid or declared or any distribution made on the common
stock, . . . unless and until (1) the full dividend on the preferred stock for all past
quarter-yearly dividend periods shall have been paid, and the full dividend thereon for
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payment of both arrears and currently accruing dividends on the preferred
stock are conditions precedent to any payment of dividends on the common,
and although the right to arrears on preferred stock is functionally similar
to the right to subsequently accruing dividends on it, in that both are con-
tingent charges ahead of common against net profits to be earned in the
future, the courts have singled out the right of the preferred shareholders
to payment of their past accrued dividends ahead of any payment to the
common as entitled to special protection. 4
The consequences which follow from this analysis are graphically illus-
trated in the history of Wilson & Company, incorporated in Delaware in
1925. By an amendment to its articles of incorporation a year later its
authorized capital stock included 57o Class A stock, non-cumulative up to
1930 and cumulative thereafter, and common stock. In 1935 there were
accumulated and unpaid dividends on the class A stock amounting to over
$21 per share-a total of over $6,600,000 on all the shares of that class
issued and outstanding under the 1926 amendment of the corporate charter.
In 1935 a recapitalization plan duly adopted by a majority of the stockholders
converted each share of Class A stock with its accumulated arrears into
five shares of common. A Class A shareholder who refused to join in the
exchange sought to have the plan declared void insofar as it purported to
destroy his right to be paid the arrears in dividends which had accrued on
his stock. To his complaint the corporation interposed a demurrer which
was sustained by the court of chancery in Kcller v. Wilson & Company"
on the basis of an amendment adopted in 1927 to Section 26 of the Delaware
Corporation Law,6 which authorized corporations to amend their charters
by reclassifying their outstanding capital stock for the purpose of altering
the "participating, optional, or other special rights of the shares." 7 The
court of chancery construed the right of cumulative preferred stockholders
to be paid arrearages of dividends as a "special right" of that class of stock
the then current quarter-yearly dividend period shall have been paid or declared and
a sum sufficient for the payment thereof set apart." Certificate of Incorporation of
Gimbel Brothers, Inc. (1922).
4. See Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 At. 696
(1923), (1924) 8 MiNN. L. Rv. 617; Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mer-
cantile Marine Corp., 101 N. J. Eq. 554, 139 At. 50 (1927), (1928) 28 CoL L. REV.
662, (1928) 26 MicH. L. REv. 684; and see Roberts v. Roberts-Wick Co., 184 N. Y.
257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906). Cf. BEm AND MEANS, MOouR" CRPoaAToI0 AZD PnIVA=-
PnoPERTy (1932) 268, 269.
After the dividends have matured, the right to their payment has also been treated
a- a right of property. See infra note 13.
5. 180 AtL 584 (Del. Ch. 1935), rodd, Del. Sup. Ct, Nov. 10, 1936, (1936)
36 CL L. REv. 674.
6. Dmr. RE v. CODE (1935) § 2058.
7. Prior to the change, the statute conferred merely a general power to amend,
with a provision that if any amendment proposed to alter the preference given to any
class of preferred stock, the stockholders so affected were to be entitled to vote there-
on. 26 P.,uER, Coap. MAxuAL (1925) 175, 176.
1937]
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within the amended Section 26. As such a special right it was held subject
to alteration by the vote of the majority of the shareholders.8
On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court the ruling of the Chancellor
was reversed on several grounds.) It was pointed out that Wilson & Com-
pany's stock was issued prior to the 1927 amendment to Section 26, at a
time when neither the charter nor the statute expressly provided for the
cancellation of accrued and unpaid dividends as against the dissent of a share-
holder. 10 It was supposed that one who at that time invested in cumulative
preferred stock relied upon the representation in the charter that accumu-
lated dividends would at some time be entirely satisfied. This representation
imparted value to the stock, reflected even during periods when dividends
were not declared. To permit the corporation to cancel arrears, even with
the consent of the majority of stockholders affected by the plan, would in
effect deprive the preferred stockholders who dissented of the right to
receive $21 for each share of stock held by them before the holders of the
common could be paid any dividends. This was a substantial right, which
could not have been extinguished prior to 1927 without unanimous stock-
holder consent. The court concluded that a retrospective application of the
1927 amendment of the statute to accrued dividends on stock issued in 1926
would raise constitutional doubts on the score of impairing the obligation
of contracts,11 and viewed the amendment as inapplicable.
8. Cf. Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C.C.A. 2d, 1933),
modifying 2 F. Supp. 517 (S. D. N. Y. 1932), cert. denied 290 U. S. 673 (1933).
9. Keller v. Wilson & Co., Sinclair Murray Cap. Changes Serv. F T 35 (Del.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, (1936). See N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Nov. 11, 1936, p. 49, col. 6. The
case has been noted in (1937) 31 ILL. L. REV. 661, (1937) 35 Micn. L. Ra. 620,
(1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 537. See also (1937) 23 VA. L. REV. 579.
10. For these reasons case law definitely prohibited it. Morris v. American Public
Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Ati. 696 (Ch. 1923). The chancellor in Keller v.
Wilson & Co. assumed that it was to obviate the inhibitions imposed by the Morris case
that section 26 was amended. See 180 Ati. 584, 585 (Del. Ch. 1935).
11. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 10. Accord: Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel
Co., 34 F. (2d) 533. 542-547 (D. R.I. 1929), (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 279, (1930)
43 HARV. L. REv. 656, (1930) 28 Micu. L. REV. 1009, (1930) 14 MINN. L. REV. 413,
(1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 282. But cf. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del.
Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (Ch. 1928), criticized in Comment (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV.
256, noted (1929) 29 COL. L. REy. 88, (1928) 14 CORN. L. Q. 85.
Amendments adopted under statutes enacted subsequently to incorporation have
frequently been sustained where the rights affected seem less substantial. See Berger
v. United States Steel Corp., 63 N. J. Eq. 809, 53 Atl. 68 (1902), rezvg 63 N. J. Eq.
506, 53 Atl. 14 (Ch. 1902) (retirement of preferred stock out of bonds) ; Grausman v.
Porto Rican-Americai Tobacco Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 155, 121 Atl. 895 (Ch. 1923), aff'd, 95
N. J. Eq. 223, 122 Ati. 815 (1923) (authorization of no par stock); Hinckley v.
Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dep't
1905) (authorization of preferred stock).
Amendments making non-assessable stock assessable have been considered to be
of this character. Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127
Pac. 464 (1912): Gardner v. Hope Insurance Co., 9 R. 1. 194 (1861).
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As a result of this decision, several Delaware corporations which had
issued cumulative preferred stock prior to 1927 felt compelled to abandon
similar recapitalization plans which had either already received majority
shareholder approval at the time the case was decided or were then under
consideration.' 2 This part of the decision seems inapplicable, however, to
the stock of Delaware corporations issued after 1927. Representations in
such stock that cumulative dividends undeclared shall be paid before any
distribution to the common shareholders might well be deemed subject to
the statutory provision in effect at the time the securities were issued that
"special rights" of the shares may be changed by majority action. It should
make no difference to the legality of such action that the charter amendment
is adopted before rather than after maturity of the dividends affected. The
right to accumulated dividends which are to become due in the future is
functionally the same as the right to dividends already accrued; each repre-
sents a preference ahead of common in the distribution of future earnings. 3
Although the issue was not presented to it, the court in the Keli r case
declared that even if application of the statute to unpaid dividends on securi-
ties issued prior to its enactment were not unconstitutional and even if the
"special rights" of that statute included the right to have unpaid dividends
accumulate in the future, the recapitalization plan proposed still could not
deprive a dissenting stockholder of his claim to arrears, which were viewed
as more tangible interests than the "special rights" referred to in the statute.
This conclusion was reached by a peculiar interpretation of Section 26, as
amended. To avoid a result which might defeat the expectations of in-
vestors, Section 26 was construed not as authorizing the cancellation of
accrued dividends directly, which its words reasonably seem to mean, but
rather as conferring upon corporations the power to amend their charters
to provide that they may be cancelled by future action. The court said that
so long as the corporation's power to amend its charter had not been exer-
cised, dividends would mature and become payable and would never be
subject to cancellation. Thus the result of the Keller case is that while a
Delaware corporation which had issued stock after 1927 may amend its
12. These corporations included Consolidated Retail Stores, Inc., and Federal Water
Service Corporation. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1936, p. 40, col. 6; N. Y. Herald-
Tribune, Nov. 12, 1936, p. 37, col 3; N. Y. Sun, Nov. 13, 1936, p. 45, col. 5. Subse-
quently, the National Supply Company of Delaware also withdrew its recapitalization
plan. N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1936, p. 49, col. 2. And still later, on February 10, 1937,
the Alliance Investment Corporation followed suit. (Feb. 20, 1937) 144 Com.m &
FiN. Caox. 1265.
13. But cf. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 DeL Ch. 135, 149-151,
122 AtL 696, 701-703 (Ch. 1923) where the court, considering the relations of the
stockholders inter sese, was of the opinion that "there is every reason to hold that as
soon as the agreed dividend which the preferred stockholder is to receive is matured
by time, a right to its ultimate payment as against those who have agreed to its payment
becomes a vested right. It is a present property interest."
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charter so as to provide that accumulated unpaid dividends on that stock
may be cancelled, such an amendment cannot be effective to cancel divi-
dends accrued prior to the time of its adoption. The effect of such a charter
amendment can only be that a claim to dividends accumulated subsequent
to its adoption will thereafter be subject to be defeated by the will of the
majority or other requisite number of the stockholders.
There is considerable doubt as to whether the benefits of this type of amend-
ment, permitting dividends accumulated after such amendment to be wiped
out by subsequent action of the corporation, will be available where the
preferred stock to be affected was issued prior to 1927. Under the first
ground of decision in the Keller case, the right of a dissenting stockholder
whose stock was issued before 1927 to be paid arrears on his stock was
held not to have been affected by the amended Section 26. That case, how-
ever, was concerned only with an attempt to cancel arrears accumulated
prior to the corporate action there taken. While there may be no distinction,
so far as an impairment of the obligation of contracts is concerned, between
the right to be paid arrears which have already accrued and the right to be
paid arrears which are to accrue later,14 the considerations of policy which
influenced the court would not militate so forcefully against a similar amend-
ment designed to operate prospectively. Merely to place the stockholder
on warning that his right to be paid dividends subsequently to accrue is
henceforth defeasible is not in financial opinion so drastic a change in stock-
holders' rights as wiping out arrears already accrued; in that it operates
only prospectively and reduces the value of the cumulative feature of the
stock, such a charter amendment would be analogous to an amendment con-
verting cunmlative preferred prospectively into non-cumulative stock, a change
which is valid under Section 26 even as it stood prior to the amendment
of 1927.1r The distinction between "vested" and "prospective" rights is one
of the most common issues in charter amendment cases, and corporations
are permitted many liberties with the future rights of stockholders which
cannot be taken with respect to claims which in some tangible way have been
ascertained, measured, or set aside.' 6 It seems to be enough of a distinction
to justify a court in regarding the logic of the Keller case as inapplicable,
so as to permit corporations under Section 26, as amended, to alter the rights
of preferred stockholders, whose securities were issued before 1927, to have
future dividend claims cumulated.
While the Keller case settles only the law of Delaware, the decision is
significant both because of the large number of companies incorporated in
Delaware and because of the probable effect of the holding in other juris-
dictions. Although courts in general have allowed amendments changing
14. See notes 4, 13, 16.
15. Yoakarn v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Co.. 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R.I. 1929), dis-
cussions cited supra note 11.
16. See supra note 14 and infra notes 17, 18, 19 and 20.
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other features of a class of stock, such as its proportionate right to divi-
dends,' 7 its redemption price,18 its voting powers,10 and the preferences to
which it is entitled,20 no court to which the question has been presented has
17. Peters v. United States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 At. 598 (CI. 1921)
(preferred stock deprived for the future of its existing opportunity to share in surplus
remaining after payment of fixed dividends on preferred and common stock); Davis
v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 At. 654 (Ch. 1928) (future
reduction in proportionate 'rights to dividends which class B stock originally had over
class A), criticized in Comment (1928) 77 U. oF PA. L REv. 256, noted (1929) 29
Cor- L Rxv. 88, (1928) 14 Coiur. L Q. 85; Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Co.,
34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. . 1929) (cumulative preferred stock deprived of its cumulative
feature for the future), supra note 11; Grausman v. Porto Rican-American Tobacco
Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 155, 121 At. 895 (Ch. 1923), aff'd, 95 N. 3. Eq. 223, 122 At. 815
(1923) (common stock endowed with a preferential 7% cumulative dividend over a
new issue). Contra: Pronick v. Spirits Distributing Co., 58 N. 3. Eq. 97, 42 AtL 526
(Ch. 1899) (amendment reducing dividend rate on preferred stock voided as against
a dissenting stockholder).
1& Where redemption is optional with the corporation, changes therein are liberally
allowed. Morris"v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 At. 696, (Ch.
1923) (reduction in redemption price from $105 to $100 per share); Davis v. Louisville
Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del CI. 157, 142 At. 654 (CI. 1928) (termination of corpora-
tion's option to redeem).
Where stock is non-callable, however, it cannot henceforth be made redeemable.
Breslav v. New York and Queens Electric Light and Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181,
291 N. Y. Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd without opinion, March 16, 1937, N. Y.
Times, March 17, 1937, p. 8, col. 5, (1937) 46 YAmx L. J. 1055. Where redemption is
compulsory, extension of the redemption date is ineffective. Sutton v. Globe Knitting
Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N. IV. 815, 105 A. L. R. 1447 (1936), (1936) 4 U. oF CHL
L REv. 139; Accord: Kaleta v. Archer Coal & Material Co., 5 N. E. (2d) 879 (App.
Ct. Ill. 1936). Where the compulsory redemption feature is fortified by a sinking fund,
the corporation cannot by amendment relieve itself of the obligation to make the pre-
scribed payments thereto. Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533
(D. R. L 1929) supra note 11.
19. An amendment providing for cumulative voting has been sustained. Loo!:er v.
Maynard, 179 U. S. 46 (1900). And an amendment taking away the right to vote
cumulatively has also been upheld, notwithstanding that its purpose was to defeat the
attempt of minority stockholders to elect a member of the board. Maddock v. Vorcione
Corp., 17 Del Ch. 39, 147 At. 255 (1929). Preferred shareholders may be completely
deprived of the right to vote. Randle v. Vinona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 790
(1921); Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 AU. 696 (Ch.
1923).
Where preferred stock has no voting power except the contingent right of exclusive
control upon the non-payment of cumulative dividends for a specified period, such a
voting right, being a method whereby the preferred shareholders may preserve their
equity in a corporation approaching insolvency and protect their interest in the accum-
ulation of dividends unpaid, serious doubt has been cast whether it would be subject
to amendment in the absence of a specific charter provision to that effect. See Yralmm
v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533, 541 (D. R. L 1929).
20. Many corporation laws make specific provision for amendments altering prefer-
ence rights. See e.g., DE. REv. CoDE (1935) §2058; IL.. REV. STAT. ATIm. (Smith-
Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157.52; N. Y. STocm CORP. LAw, § 36; Omo GL.,. Caz Aim.
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yet upheld a recapitalization plan which cancels accumulated arrears accrued
prior to the time of the cancellation.2 1 'Whether the courts of states other
than Delaware will give effect to an amendment providing for tile cancella-
tion of arrears to be accumulated in the future depends upon the extent and
judicial construction of the power of amendment conferred by the corpora-
tion laws of the particular state. Most statutes, however, are not so broad
as Delaware's Section 26 ;22 and where they do not include authority to
change "preferences" or "special rights" of the shares, such an alteration
must be based upon the general power to amend reserved in every corporate
charter-a power which, although subject to wide variations of construction,
is generally construed more narrowly than Section 26.23
(Page, Supp. 1935) §§ 8623-14, 8623-4. Under such laws preferred stock may, for
the future, be deprived of its cumulative feature. Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel
Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1929). And stock having prior preference over outstanding
preferred stock may be created. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch.
136, 122 At. 696 (Ch. 1923); General Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather
Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Atl. 244 (1925), (1925) 11 CORN. L. Q. 78.
21. Kennedy v. Carolina Public Service Co., 262 Fed. 803 (N. D. Ga. 1920);
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Ati. 696 (Ch. 1923),
(1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 617; Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72n,
67 Atl. 657 (Ch. 1907), rev'd on other grounds, 75 N. J. Eq. 229, 72 Atl. 126 (1909) ;
Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Corp., 101 N. J. Eq.
554, 139 Atl. 50 (1927), (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 662, (1928) 26 Micn. L. REv. 684;
Roberts v. Roberts-Wick Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906); Accord: General
Investment Co. v. American Hide & Leather Co.. 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Ati. 244 (1925),
(1925) 11 CORN. L. Q. 78; McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond & Mortgage Co., 168 Ga.
145, 147 S. E. 102 (1929). See BERLE AND M1EANS, MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) 267-270; cf. Thomas v. Laconia Car Co., 251 Mass. 529, 146 N. E.
775 (1925) ; Willson v. Laconia Car Co., 275 Mass. 435, 176 N. E. 182 (1931) ; Willcox
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 173, 53 At1. 474 (Ch. 1902). But cf. Harr v.
Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C.C.A. 2d, 1933), nodijying 2 F. Supp.
517 (S. D. N. Y. 1932), cert. dcnicd 290 U. S. 673 (1933) ; Windhurst v. Central
Leather Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 621, 149 Ati. 36 (Ch. 1930); BER.LE AND MEANS, suprao,
214-219. The English courts allow the consummation of recapitalization plans which
cancel accumulated arrears where they are equitable. The Oban and Aultmore-Glenlivet
Distilleries, Ltd., [1903] 5 Sess. Cas. 1140; Last v. Buller and Co., Ltd., 36 T. L. R.
35 (Ch. Div. 1919).
22. The corporation laws of Illinois and Ohio are even more liberal in the power
to amend granted to corporations than the laws of Delaware. See ILL. REV. STAT. ANN.
(Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, §157.52; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, Supp. 1935)
§§ 8623-14, 8623-4. Pennsylvania follows closely the Delaware statute. PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 15, § 2852-801. New York's stock corporation law is slightly
more restrictive and does not include authority to change "special rights." N. Y. STOcK
CORPORATION LAW, § 36. With few exceptions, powers to amend by the laws of other
states are, in the main, worded generally.
23. See Farbstein v. Pacific Oil Tool Co., Ltd., 127 Cal. App. 157, 15 P. (2d)
766 (1932) (amendment making non-assessible stock assessible upheld though the cor-
poration laws did not specifically provide for such a change); Peters v. United States
Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 Ati. 598 (Ch. 1921) (amendment depriving preferred
992 I Vol. 46: 985
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As a practical matter, however, it is not likely that many corporations
will seek to amend their charters to permit the cancellation of dividends to
accrue on preferred stock. In the first place, such an amendment would
have no effect upon the accumulated arrears which have been piling up during
the depression and which it is the main concern of current recapitalization
plans to wipe out. Secondly, the conversion of cumulative preferred into non-
cumulative would be a far more direct method of providing for future de-
pressions; for the presence of the power to cancel dividends to accrue would
make the cumulative feature of preferred stock illusory and would deprive
it of the special attractiveness to the investor which cumulative rights are
designed to add.24 For the contingency against which the holder of cumu-
lative preferred' seeks security-a period of no dividend declarations-is
likely in the future to compel the cancellation of accrued dividends pursuant
to such a charter amendment. It would be more practical for a corporation
to continue, in the teeth of the Keller case, to attempt some readjustment
whereby preferred stockholders will be induced to surrender their claims
to arrears on their shares. And many corporations have followed this
course.25 Although the bargaining position of the preferred stockholders in
stock of its existing opportunity to share in surplus remaining after payment of fixed
dividends on preferred and common stock sustained under the general power to amend
granted by Delaware's Section 26 prior to the amendment of 1927). Morris v. American
Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 At. 696 (Ch. 1923) (depriving preferred
stockholders of right to vote held to be not such a change in property rights as to
be exempt from amendment where general power to amend is reserved); Salt Lake
Automobile Co. v. Keith-O'Brien Co., 45 Utah 218, 143 Pac. 234 (1914).
But see Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533, 543 (D. R. I.
1929) (extinguishment of the obligation to make prescribed payments to the sinking
fund for redemption of preferred stock invalid under general power to amend) ; Sutton
v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N. V. 815 (1936) (extension of date of
compulsory redemption ineffective under general power to amend); Breslav v. New
York and Queens Electric Light and Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp.
932 (2d Dep't 1936) aff'd without opinion, March 16, 1937, N. Y. Times, March 17,
1936, p. 8, coL 5, (corporation cannot make non-callable stock redeemable in absence
of specific provision to that effect) ; Pronick v. Spirits Distributing Co., 58 N. J. Eq.
97, 42 Atl. 586 (Ch. 1899) (general power of amendment insufficient to sustain a
change in dividend rates); McKenzie v. Guaranteed Bond & Mortgage Co., 163 Ga.
145, 147 S. E. 102 (1929) (general authority to amend does not confer pover to make
"vital, radical or fundamental amendments" by majority vote, such as increasing the
capital stock or funding unpaid cumulative dividends); Accord: Sutherland v. Olcott,
95 N. Y. 93 (1883).
24. As early as 1921, it was observed that the cumulative feature of preferred stock
is of little practical value. "If a considerable amount of the unpaid dividends accumulate,
and the company meets with more prosperous conditions, the managers, who probably
control the common stock, will often try to induce the preferred shareholders to sur-
render their claims on the plea of some equitable adjustment:' 1 DawrNG, FiN.'cxAL
Poucy op ConsoRATioxs (1st ed. 1921) 125, 126. This has been reiterated more fore-
fully in later editions. Id. (rev. ed. 1926) at 59, 60; id. (3d ed. 1934) at 55.
25. Corporations presently offering recapitalization plans providing for the cancel-
lation of accumulated arrears include Dominion Tar & Chemical Co., Ltd. (March 13,
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the recapitalization process may have been improved by the Keller case, it
has not been so improved as to make reorganization impracticable. 20 Insofar
as the preferred shareholders consent to the plans proposed, they are bound.
The impact of the Keller case is felt only in that dissenting stockholders can
not be forced to join in the exchange. They have either to be paid off in
full or they must be suffered to keep their original shares with the appurten-
ant claim to arrears.
If the new certificates given to consenting stockholders in exchange for
their old shares and for the arrears accumulated on them bear the same
provisions as the original preferred stock or are junior to them, no diffi-
culties are created by the refusal of a minority dissenting stockholder to
surrender his stock. The dissenter's status in relation to the consenting
shareholders has not been jeopardized by such an exchange and he has no
cause to complain. But it is likely that in addition to attempting to fund
the arrears the recapitalization plan will change other features of the pre-
ferred stock. In an effort to simplify and unify the financial structure of
the corporation the plan may convert part or all of the preferred stock into
common by altering its preferences.2 7 Thd dividend rate on the preferred
may be reduced2 and the price at which it is redeemable at the corporation's
option may be decreased. 29 In order to invite participation in the plan, it
1937) 144 Co..r. & Fix. CnRo.. 1781: General Alloys Co. (March 13, 1937) id. at
1784; Illinois Power & Light Corp. (March 6, 1937) id. at 1602; International Silver
Co. (March 6, 1937) id. at 1603; Grand Union Co. (Feb. 6, 1937) id at 937.
26. The capital structure of Wilson & Company as a result of its recapitalization
was not disturbed by the Keller case. The only immediate effect of the decision was
the necessity for special treatment of the dissenting shareholders.
27. The plan of reorganization of Amalgamated Leather Companies, Inc., as pro-
posed in its letter to stockholders, dated July 25, 1936, provided for the exchange of
each share of outstanding $7 preferred stock (on which had accumulated $105.25 per
share as of July 1, 1936) for one share of new $3 preferred stock and 5 shares of new
common stock. This necessitated the exchange of each share of common stock out-
standing for 2/Sths of a share of new common stock.
Instead of changing outright part of the old preferred stock into common, the plan
may make the new preferred stock convertible into common at the option of the holder.
This was the procedure followed in the plan of Collins & Aikman Corporation. which
provided for the exchange of its 7%' preferred stock, of $100 par value, into 5% pre-
ferred convertible into 1 2/3rds shares of common stock, each share of which was
selling at approximately $60 at the time the plan was formulated. This plan was
confirmed by the shareholders Feb. 26, 1937. (Feb. 27, 1937) 144 Coma. & Fix. CitRoN.
1432.
And note the plan of Wilson & Company, supra p 987. which converted each share
of its Class A stock into 5 shares of common.
28. See e..g.. the plans of Amalgamated Leather Companies, Inc. and Collins &
Aikman Corp., supra note 27.
29. See e. g.. the plan of, recapitalization of Marshall Field & Company as outlined
in the material soliciting proxies, dated Nov. 28. 1936. As of Sept. 30, 1936, accumulated
dividends on the ,,ntstanding 7' preferred stock amounted to $31.50 per share. Under
the plan, holders of this preferred stock were to receive in exchange for each share
[Vol. 46: 985
19371 CORPORATE RECAPITALIZATION
may be provided that the new stock issued in exchange for the old carry
with it a prior preference as to dividends and participation in the assets upon
liquidation or dissolution. 0
If changes such as these are made in the preferred stock, the refusal of
a minority stockholder to join in the exchange for the purpose of relinquish-
ing his claim to arrears may make his relation to the corporation an anom-
olous one. If the changes other than the funding of arrears are authorized
by the corporation laws, the dissenting shareholder is bound by them.3 ' Thus
while he cannot be compelled to accept any new security insofar as it repre-
sents a satisfaction of his claim to arrears, he is bound to accept it insofar
as it represents his original stock and is a valid amendment of his "contract"
as stockholder, authorized by the corporation laws. Furthermore, since the
minority stockholder is entitled to insist that his status within his class be
preserved,32 he should not be deprived of that proportion of the new stock
exchanged for the old without arrears merely because he refuses to sur-
render his claim to arrears. In practice it is extremely difficult to work out
this analysis of the rights of the preferred shareholder. Recapitalization plans
do not usually distinguish between one part of the stock offer as an exchange
for the principal of the old preferred, and another as given for the arrears.
Where new shares are offered for both old stock and arrears, it may cause
(a) $11.50 in cash, (b) one share of 6% preferred stock, and (c) 5/6ths of a share
of common stock. Whereas the old 7% preferred stock was redeemable at $120, the
new 6% stock was made callable at $110. This plan was approved Dec. 26, 1936 (Jan.
2, 1937) 144 Commn. & Fnr. Camom 110. And note the plan of Consolidated Film
Industries, Inc., infra p. 1000. See Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del.
Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (Ci. 1923).
30. See e.g., the plan of Otis Steel Co., described in the letter to stockholders, dated
Oct. 5, 1936. As of Oct. 1, 1936, arrears in dividends on its 7% preference stock of
$100 par value amounted to $36.75 per share. It was proposed to create a new 1st
preferred stock, without par value, carrying $5.50 in dividends, which was to have
priority over the outstanding preference stock. Each share of the old preference stock
was to be exchanged for 1.28 shares of the new 1st preferred stock, plus 1/2 share of
common stock. What seemed to be a radical alteration in dividend provisions did not,
in fact, substantially alter the annual amount to which the preferred stockholder Vas
entitled originally. $5.50 per share on 1.28 shares of the new stock equals $7.04 in
dividends per share of old preferred stock.
For another plan which provided for the exchange of an outstanding preferred stock
for a prior issue see the proposition of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., as set forth
in its Plan for the Rearrangement of Capitalication, dated Sept. 26, 1936. This plan
was declared operative on Nov. 27, 1936. N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1936, p. 36, cols.
6, 7, 8.
And see Matter of Duer, 270 N. Y. 343, 1 N. E. (2d) 457 (1936), (1937) 85 U.
oF PA. L. REv. 324.
31. See supra notes 17, 18, 19 and 20.
32. See Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159 (1879); Campbell v.
American Zylonite Co., 122 N. Y. 455, 25 N. E. 853 (1890); Stokes v. Continental
Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. 1090 (1906).
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difficulties if the dissenter retains his claim to arrears and at the same time
tries to preserve his status with relation to other shareholders of his class,
by claiming rights under new shares to the extent that they are offered in
exchange for the old alone. The corporation will eventually seek to pay
dividends on the new securities issued to the majority in exchange for 'the
original preferred stock plus its accumulations. Where the new securities
are prior preference stock, the question will arise whether the corporation
may pay dividends on this new class before making payments to dissenters on
their original preferred and its arrears. When dividends are declared on the
new stock, these payments may represent (a) dividends on stock (the old
preferred validly amended) which the dissenter is bound to take and to
which he is entitled, and (b) payments on account of accumulated arrears.
The minority shareholder may make two demands: (1) That no dividends
be paid on the new prior stock unless he also is paid an equal dividend. To
the extent that the changes effectuated under the plan were binding upon
all stockholders, the dissenter should share in whatever benefits the plan
confers in the valid exchange of stock without the arrears. Since the dis-
senter may not be deprived of the arrears on his stock, the fact that he
refused to exchange his shares under the plan in order to preserve his right
to those arrears should not preclude him from sharing in the portions of
the plan which were properly authorized. (2) That no dividend be paid
on the new prior stock unless he also is paid an equal amount on account
of his accumulated arrears. To the extent that the new prior stock repre-
sents funded arrears a dissenter cannot be compelled to exchange but may
retain his claim to those arrears. But to permit the payment of dividends
upon stock representing the arrears of the consenting shareholders before
paying any of the arrears of the dissenters would not only confine to narrow
quarters the protection offered by Keller v. Wilson & Company against the
cancellation of accrued dividends, but would effectively render that pro-
tection nugatory.
33
These two demands of the dissenting shareholder, however, have been
rejected in two cases. In Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Company 4
it was considered proper for the corporation to pay out of income to be
earned subsequent to the adoption of a plan of recapitalization dividends
on the new prior stock in advance of satisfying the accrued dividends on the
original preferred. The plan there under consideration, however, expressly
preserved all rights of non-assenting preferred shareholders with respect to
the accumulated earned surplus which at the time of the adoption of the
plan was available for dividend purposes.35 The fact that the corporation
had accumulated a substantial earned surplus"6 which may have been more
33. Cf. note (1924) 8 MINN. L. Rzv. 617, 618.
34. 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I. 1929).
35. Id. at 541, 542.
36. Id. at 536.
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than sufficient to satisfy the claims of all the minority shareholders may
perhaps detract from the conclusiveness of the decision, which otherwise
clearly accepted the priority given to assenting shareholders with respect
to the stock they had received for the arrears.
The same inconclusiveness cannot be urged to distinguish Matter of
Duer,37 recently. decided in New York. The recapitalization plan there
involved invited the holders of the original preferred stock (upon each share
of which there had accumulated $32 in arrears) to receive in exchange
therefor a new prior preference non-cumulative security, to be preferred as
to dividends and on dissolution over the outstanding preferred. Spencer
Trask & Company, a preferred stockholder, remained passive; it neither
consented to the plan nor surrendered its shares for exchange. When,
several years later, the reorganized corporation was dissolved and it was
found that its assets would not be sufficient to pay the holders of the new
prior preference securities in full, Spencer Trask & Company sought to
participate equally with them in the assets. Its petition was denied. The
single reason assigned was that when the majority stockholders made the
exchange relinquishinjg arrears, a new contract was made which endowed
them with certain preferences on dissolution. The court considered itself
powerless to change the priorities thereby created.
The strongest defense of this decision is that it makes for administrative
simplicity. Although a new contract had been entered into, which, it is
true, a court should not change so far as it concerned those who participated
in it, the non-assenting stockholder had no part in that contract. What the
court did not discuss was the effect of the new contract as an invasion of
rights which had matured under the original contract of Spencer Trask &
Company, set forth in the charter.
Inasmuch as the corporation laws of New York as do not permit charter
amendment to alter "special rights," there would seem to be even less
chance in New York than in Delaware to uphold as binding upon dissenters
a recapitalization plan cancelling accrued arrears on preferred stock. There-
fore it seem anomolous to permit the result reached in Matter of Duer," which
indicates that arrears may be so subordinated to the claims of stockholders
who exchange them for new securities as to lose practically all value as pre-
ferred interests. Instead of regarding the new preferred stock as in part
an amendment of the original preferred, under which the dissenter could
claim equal rights with those consenting,4 0 the court treated it as a separate
security, with a priority over outstanding shares of the original preferred
as complete as if the new stock had been issued for cash. If the courts treat
such new securities in this way, the result of the Duer case seems inevitable,
37. 270 N. Y. 343, 1 N. E. (2d) 457 (1936), (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L Rnv. 324.
38. N. Y. STocx CoRpoRATIoN LAW § 36.
39. See supra note'37.
40. See supra notes 17, 18, 19, 20 and 32.
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for many states permit the issuance of new securities which will rank ahead
of existing preferred stock.4 1 Although courts have protected investors by
classifying the preferred stockholder's claim to accrued dividends as some-
thing more than a "preference" right, and therefore inaccessible to amend-
ment by authority of the statute, that effort will be futile if the corporation
is allowed to use its control over conceded preference rights to achieve the
end, otherwise prohibited, of forcing preferred stockholders to acquiesce in
the plan to fund accumulated arrears on their stock.
42
The dissenter's demand that no dividend be paid on the new stock offered
under the plan of recapitalization unless he is also paid an equal amount
on account of his arrears has been recognized where preferred stock co-
ordinate with the original preferred shares are issued in lieu of accumulated
arrears relinquished. In Wilcox v. Trenton Potteries Company48 such fund-
ing certificates bearing 4% "interest" were offered in satisfaction of arrears
accumulated on preferred stock. When the directors set aside out of earnings
a sum equal to 4% of the funding certificates, they were, at the behest of
a dissenter, decreed to be under a duty to set aside a proportionate sum for
the benefit of non-assenting preferred shareholders.
In the normal situation, however, any special protection of the minority
stockholder's rights may be largely superfluous. The number of dissenters
will ordinarily be negligible, and exchanges made under the recapitalization
plan will have reduced to an inconsiderable amount the arrears on the pre-
ferred stock which stand in the way of dividends on the common. The cor-
poration will often hasten to pay off these back charges," and the com-
41. See Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Corp., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. I.
1929); Harr v. Piopieer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2, 1933) modifying
2 F. Supp. 517 (1932) cert. denicd 290 U. S. 673 (1933); Morris v. American Public
Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 AtI. 696 (Ch. 1923); City of Covington v. Covington
Bridge Co., 73 Ky. 69 (1873); General Investment Co. v. American Hide and Leather
Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Ati. 244 (1925), (1925) 11 CORN. L. Q. 78; Hincdey v.
Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dep't
1905); Salt Lake Automobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co., 45 Utah 218, 143 Pac. 1015
(1914); Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928) semble, (1928) 37
YALE L. J. 1153.
42. It may be that a plan which achieves a funding of arrears indirectly by a
coercive manipulation of preferences will be regarded not as involving the corporation's
power to alter preferences but as an illegal effort to divest stockholders of their claims
to unpaid accrued dividends. See Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.
(2d) 533, 537 (D. R. I. 1929) ("an exchange at law is compulsory if to refrain from
it would result in an obvious and substantial loss.").
43. 64 N. J. Eq. 173, 53 Atl. 474 (Ch. 1902).
44. Less than two months after adoption of a recapitalization plan by Marshall
Field & Company (which funded $20 in arrears on each preferred share) the minority
preferred stockholders who did not join in the exchange received $23.50 on each
share, which constituted full satisfaction of dividend payments, not only for arrears,




mon stockholders will be in a position to receive long interrupted dividends
on their investment.
While funding of arrears does not relieve the corporation of any liability,
the corporation's credit standing may be enhanced to some extent. These
recapitalization plans usually translate the contingent claim for accrued divi-
dends into a form which interferes less directly with current financing, and
permits current earnings to be distributed to more than one class of security
holders, a result which allows the corporation either to issue new securities
of these types, or to use them as collateral for bank loans. The common
shareholders, of course, benefit from the adoption of such a plan by getting
a more direct claim against earnings; but in a fair plan which adequately
evaluates the interests at stake, they should pay for this advantage by giving
the holders of the preferred, in exchange for their arrears, a larger claim
to earnings than they had before, either co-ordinate with .or prior to the
common.4 5
In many recapitalization plans, however, the preferred shareholders have
little to gain and much to lose; notwithstanding this fact those plans are
usually adopted by overwhelming majorities even of the holders of the pre-
ferred.4 6 The inference is irresistible that in many cases those who vote
approval to these plans do not fully appreciate the significance of their ac-
tions. The limitations of the proxy system may be held in large part
responsible for this situation.
Recapitalization plans usually first come to the attention of the average
shareholder through a letter from the management of the corporation out-
Fewer than 10% of the original preferred stock of the Goodyear Tire 4 Rubber
Company was withheld from exchange under a recapitalization plan which funded over
$11 -in arrears per share. About two months after the plan was declared op-rative
the Company announced a dividend of $14.75 a share on this unexchanged preferred
stock. N. Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1937, p. 31, col 6, (Feb. 13, 1937) 144 Corn.. & Fmn.
CHuyo. 1109.
45. Under the plan of recapitalization of Mangel Stores Corporation, for example,
each share of 6'A% preferred, par $100, was to be exchanged for one share of new
$5 preferred of no par value (convertible into 6 shares of common) and, in addition,
three shares of new common stock. This change necessitated the increasing of the
common stock authorized from 250,000 to 300,000 shares. This plan vas adopted Nov.
11, 1936. N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Nov. 13, 1936, p. 44, col. 6.
46. In the recapitalization of Marshall Field & Company, adopted Dec. 26, 1936,
only 9,819 shares of preferred stock-less than 4% of the 296,190 shares outstanding--
did not join. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1937, p. 36, col 4.
Over 75% of the preferred shareholders of Revere Copper and Brass Incorporated
voted in favor of its plan funding arrears, on Nov. 12, 1936. The management has
informed the YALE LAw JouRNAr. that the only shares which voted against the plan
did so erroneously.
More than 95% of the preferred stockholders of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
joined in a recapitalization plan which cancelled over $11 in arrears on each share
of their stock. (Feb. 13, 1937) 144 Commx. & Fiz. CHnoiR. 1785.
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lining the proposed changes and soliciting his proxy. Habitual proxy signers
do not stop to read it before giving their approval to whatever the manage-
ment proposes to do. The consent of more conscientious stockholders may
be almost as completely uninformed. The letter may be couched in such
terms that the average stockholder is given scant opportunity to realize the
full import of the changes proposed. The consent of a stockholder to have
the arrears accumulated on his stock cancelled cannot have niuch meaning
to him if he merely complies with a request to turn in his preferred stock
"with its appurtenant rights." Stockholders are notorious in sleeping on
their rights, and when their proxies are solicited by letters which convey
misleading impressions, the interests of stockholders require protection.
The recent dispute between the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the management of Consolidated Film Industries concerning the latter's
plan of recapitalization is illustrative.47 A special meeting of the stockholders
of Consolidated Film was called to be held in October, 1936, for the purpose
of obtaining their approval on a proposed plan of recapitalization. A notice
of the meeting summarizing the proposed changes was accompanied by a
letter from the president urging approval. The plan proposed by the com-
pany was in essence that by amendment of its charter the outstanding 400,000
shares of $2.00 cumulative preferred stock (upon each share of which there
were accumulated and unpaid dividends of $5) should be reclassified as
500,000 shares of $1.00 preferred stock and 100,000 shares of new common
stock; and that the outstanding 524,973 shares of common stock be reclas-
sified as 349,982 shares of new common stock, or 2 shares of the new common
for 3 of the outstanding common.
Since its preferred and common stock outstanding were listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and registered under the Securities Exchange Act,
48
the company, pursuant to Section 1449 of the Act and the regulations pro-
mulgated by the Commission thereunder, 0 filed with the Commission a
copy of its communications soliciting consents to the proposed plan. After
the filing of the notice and the president's letter, a complaint made to the
Commission by a stockholder impelled it to institute an enquiry. As a result
the question was raised as to whether certain statements in the president's
letter might be misleading, within the meaning of the Commission's proxy
regulations, which require that solicitations for proxies contain no statement
47. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 903, Oct. 22, 1936;
N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1936, p. 35, col. 1; (Oct. 24, 1936) 143 CoMm. & FiN. Cunto.
2673; and see Johnson v. Consolidated Film Industries, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 24,
1936, p. 1347, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1936).
48. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. §§78a-78jj (Supp. 1936).
49. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U. S. C.A. § 78n (Supp. 1936).
50. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 378 (Class A), Sept.
24, 1935; C. C. H. Stock Exch. Reg. Serv. j j 5281-5285c.
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which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact.51
The president's letter appeared misleading to the Commission in several
particulars :52
(1) The letter stated that "the plan reduces the fixed annual cumulative
dividend on the Preferred Stock now outstanding from $2 to $1 and provides
for the elimination of the accumulated dividends thereon . . . and in lieu
thereof gives the present Preferred holder an additional one-quarter share
of new Preference Stock and an additional one-quarter share of Common,
besides a full half of all dividends declared in excess of $1." If the preferred
stockholder was led to believe, as he well might have been, that he would
get, in the additional 1/4 share of new preference stock, something which
he did not have before, he would be mistaken. None of the soliciting ma-
terial indicated that, although the redemption price and liquidating value
of the new preference stock was to be $28 per share, the corresponding
redemption price and liquidating value of the old preferred stock was $35
per share. Thus, although the holder of each share of old Preferred Stock
was to receive 1 1/4 shares of the new preference stock, the aggregate
redemption price and aggregate liquidating value of the 1 1/4 shares of his
new stock was no greater than that of the 1 share of his old preferred
stock, $35. In return, then for 1/4 share of common, par value $1, the
preferred stockholder may have been led to relinquish his claim to accumu-
lated arrears ($5) and to consent to the reduction in the amount of annual
dividends to which he was entitled to a preference.
(2) The president's letter stated that holders of the old common stock
would, under the proposed plan, "give up one-third of their present holding
of Common Stock." If the preferred shareholders were led to believe that
they were to receive one-third of the common stock interest, their expecta-
tions were unduly optimistic. While the common shareholders were to receive
under the plan two shares of stock for each three shares of common out-
standing, the letter did not point out what was equally true-that under the
plan, since the total number of shares of common outstanding were to be
decreased, the original common shareholders would hold practically 7/9ths
of the new common stock. They were in fact to give up only about 2/9ths
of their common stock interest to the preferred shareholders.
(3) The letter stated that "the Corporation has not been able to pay
the full quarterly dividend on the presently outstanding Preferred Stock
since April 1, 1932, although payments on account have been made from time
to time.' The preferred stockholder who was led to relinquish his claim to
arrears as the symbol of a futile hope might have been astonished to learn
51. Rule L A 4, Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 378 (Class
A) Sept. 24, 1935; C. C. H. Stock Exch. Reg. Serv. 5284.
52. See supra note 47.
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that, had he been more tenacious, the corporation might well have been able
to pay off all the arrears. Despite the assertion contained in the letter, the
net earnings of the Company from January 1, 1932 to December 31, 1935
had in each year been in excess of the annual dividend requirements of the
preferred stock. At the beginning of 1936 the earned surplus of the Com-
pany amounted to almost. $3,000,000, more than enough to satisfy the arrears
of dividends on the 400,000 shares of preferred stock outstinding, at $5
per share. If default in dividends was made for reasons other than that
they were not earned, the fact should have been noted to prevent the state-
ment from being misleading.
(4) The President's letter purported to compare the position of the holders
of old preferred stock under the Company's existing capitalization with their
position under the plan. It stated: "On the present basis of distribution and
assuming, for example, $800,000 of earnings available for dividends, the old
Preferred Stock suffers a slight disadvantage under the plan, which, how-
ever, disappears and becomes a benefit if earnings substantially increase."
This statement may have been misleading in several particulars. In the first
place, it ignored the fact that under the original capitalization, if there were
any substantial increase in earnings available for distribution in excess of
$800,000, this excess would have been paid entirely to the holders of the old
preferred stock until the aggregate accumulated dividends thereon, which
the preferred stockholders were requested to give up under the plan, were
paid. Secondly, assuming earnings of $800,000, it characterized as "slight"
the disadvantage of the preferred stockholders under the plan. Yet if this
amount of earnings were available for distribution in dividends, a total of
only $683,300 would be payable as dividends on the new preferred and
common stock distributable to holders of present preferred stock under the
plan. On the other hand, if $800,000 were available for distribution in
dividends under the original capitalization, this entire amount would have
been payable on the old preferred stock, even though accumulated arrears
had been previously satisfied.
The abuses in behalf of the management inherent in the present method
of negotiating recapitalization plans may be checked in one of several ways.
It has been suggested that courts of equity be given supervisory power over
these plans---confirming them only when they are equitable to all parties
concerned. 53 This method would involve making affirmative the control of
equity now invoked only when impending recapitalization plans are attacked
by litigious minority stockholders. In such cases the courts have frequently
assessed the fairness and reasonableness of the plans presented for review.54
53. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1025, at 1049; note (1936) 36 CoL L.
REv. 674, 675.
54. See, e.g., Willcox v. Trenton Potteries Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 173, 53 At. 474
(Ch. 1902); Johnson v. Consolidated Film Industries, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 24,
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This method of affirmative control by equity, however, does not seem feasible.
To require courts to pass on all such plans would impose too great an ad-
ministrative burden on the judges, who are in any event hardly experts on
intricate problems of finance; and courts are wont to accord undue weight to
the size of the majority supporting a plan in considering its fairnessCs
The Securities Act of 193350 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 r
offer other possibilities of control. One of them might be to condition the
consummation of all recapitalization plans of corporations whose securities
are subject to federal control upon the approval of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, whose function in the process would be to protect the
interests of all stockholders. The Commission is better fitted than the ju-
diciary to pass judgment upon the fairness of these plans, but the imposition
of this duty would place an overwhelming and perhaps unnecessary load of
work and responsibility upon it. A second and more feasible plan would be
to revise the form of the statements utilized to solicit proxies for recapital-
izations. Under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange ActO the Commission
is authorized to make regulations governing the solicitations of proxies in
respect to securities registered on the national exchanges. The Commission
1936, p. 1347, col 4 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.). In Outwater v. Public Service Corporation,
103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 Ad. 729 (Ch. 1928) a merger agreement was enjoined because
it was unfair to the minority stockholders. The court placed the burden on the majority
to show that the plan was fair and equitable. See Bmz.P AND MEANs, MoDEM ConroaA-
oN Am PRrvATE PnorPEr (1932) 247 et seq., especially 267-276.
55. The most forthright statement of this tendency comes from England. In In re
Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light Company, Ltd., (1904) 1 Ch. 87, it was observed
that whether a scheme does or does not accord e.xactly with the legal rights of the
shareholders, the court may consider whether it is fair or unfair. In so doing, the
wishes of the shareholders who are affected by the scheme are taken into consideration.
And a majority obtained in favor of a plan was said to go far toward showing that
the shareholders regard it as a fair one. In Perry v. Bank of Commerce, 116 Miss.
838, 855, 77 So. 812, 814 (1917) the court observed that if it should hold the amend-
ment (decreasing capital stock) to be invalid, the "absurd situation" would result of
one stockholder preventing the corporation from changing the amount of its capital
stock, which change might be necessary to the best interests of the corporation.
And see Berger v. United States Steel Corporation, 63 N. J. Eq. E09, 812, 53 At.
68, 69 (1902), rev'g 63 N. J. Eq. 506, 53 At. 14 (Ch. 1902); Grausman v. Porto
Rican-American Tobacco Company, 95 N. J. Eq. 155, 162, 121 At. 895, 893 (Cb.
1923), aff'd, 95 N. J. Eq. 223, 122 At. 815 (1923).
Cf. Lonsdale Securities Corporation v. International Mercantile Marine Corp., 101
N. J. Eq. 554, 139 At. 50 (Ch. 1927); Outwater v. Public Service Corporation, 103
N. J. Eq. 461, 464, 143 At. 729, 730 (Ch. 1928) where the court placed the burden on
the majority of the shareholders to show that the plan was fair and equitable, and added
that judgment as to fairness is not to be influenced by the heavy vote of approval as
it otherwise would be if the vote were independent.
56. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), amendments added, 48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U.S. C. A.
§§77a-77mm (Supp. 1936).
57. See supra note 48.
58. See supra note 49.
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has already prescribed that such proxies and the material soliciting them
be listed with it,"9 and has prohibited false or misleading statements in that
material.60 Extension of these rules to compel disclosure of specific infor-
mation may be desirable. Where the proxy is solicited to be exercised in
connection with any plan of recapitalization, reorganization, or other similar
change which affects the rights of any class of securify, the rules may be
revised to compel a statement of:
(1) The amount of annual dividends to which the holder of the security
changed or affected will be entitled under the plan, as opposed to the amount
of annual dividends to which he is presently entitled, where the plan changes
dividends;
(2) The price or prices on redemption, liquidation and dissolution to
which the holder of the security changed or affected will be entitled under
the plan, as compared to the price on redemption, liquidation and dissolution
to which he is presently entitled, where the plan changes those items;
(3) The preferences to which the holder of the security changed or affected
will be entitled under the plan, in juxtaposition to the preferences possessed
prior to the plan, where the plan changes preferences;
(4) The effect of the plan on cumulative dividends accrued and unpaid,
such statement to be in a simple sentence, where the plan affects such divi-
dends;
(5) The amount of surplus available for dividends at the time of the
solicitation, where the plan proposes to cancel or fund accumulations of
dividends accrued and unpaid on any security entitled to cumulative divi-
dends;
(6) The effect on the person from whom the proxy is solicited of the
failure of the plan to be adopted;
(7) Any remedies, such as appraisal and purchase of shares by the cor-
poration, which the statutes of the state under which the corporation is
organized provide for stockholders dissenting from the plan, and the pro-
cedure provided by those statutes for obtaining the benefit of such remedies;
and
(8) The privilege of the person from whom the proxy is solicited to refuse
to sign and return his proxy.
It has been feared that more stringent proxy regulations would have only
the negative effect of decreasing the number of stockholders willing to send
in their proxies.6 1 Implicit in this fear seems to be the general observation
that proxies are secured in many instances because stockholders do not know
the significance of their approval. The stockholders interest in knowing the
truth does not cease with the issuance of the security under the Securities
59. Rule L A 5, C. C. H. Stock Exch. Reg. Serv. 5285.
60. See supra note 51.
61. See note (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 674, 675.
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